Psychiatric meetings are filled with presentations on the treatment of serious mental illness (SMI) (mainly schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) using pharmacological preparations. We know that drugs are effective in moderating these conditions in a substantial percentage of cases. We also know that drugs alone are not a panacea. Nevertheless, nonpharmacological treatments form but a small proportion of research-presentation topics.
The book has 10 chapters and most have subchapters, covering the following areas: framework (including ethical and historical aspects); the magnitude of the problem; the person's experience of illness; understanding the context of the individual; the service user-service provider relationship; management and finding common ground; prevention and health promotion; constraints; and academic (research and education) activities. A final concluding chapter provides a critical summary of the preceding content.
Twelve of the 47 contributors are psychiatrists, 20 are psychologists, and the remaining 15 represent nonphysician health care workers. This is a puzzling book. It is a comprehensive and scholarly tome that includes historical, ethical, and numerous chapters on different aspects of person-centred psychiatry perspectives. Conversely, I found myself wondering about the meaning and definition of the personcentred approach as applied to SMI. At the end, I still did not have a clear understanding of its meaning.
The book is published as one of a series entitled The Patient-Centered Clinical Method and the authors of this series write an introduction to the book. They explicitly forbade the use of the word "patient" by any of the contributors, insisting they all use the term "service user." The reasoning behind such a request is the desire to minimize medicine's paternalistic tendencies, but one wonders if making such terminological usage mandatory is not taking the anti-medical model too far. At least one of the contributors, psychiatrist Richard O'Reilly, protested against this requirement; pointing out that service users themselves, when asked, prefer to describe themselves as patients or clients. I personally strongly support the nonpharmacological approach to people with SMI, but prefer to call them patients or sometimes clients. I have little use for service user or service provider, words as dry as the dust of the Gobi desert.
Nevertheless, the book makes some very valid points. It notes that people using the biomedical model or disease model (that is, most physicians) have a tendency to focus on diagnosis and adherence to drug regimens, thus neglecting the human element of the condition.
p 235 Use of the biomedical model does not rule out a humane and person-centred approach to treatment. The best treatment models blend the humane with the biomedical, implied in the widespread use of the term biopsychosocial to describe the approach to which we should all aspire.
In several subchapters (2.2 and 3.1), the book discusses the relation between work, disability, and mental illness. It rightly emphasizes that work is beneficial to the person with SMI and that public benefit programs, with their emphasis on proving incapacity, is a barrier to rehabilitation. It notes that in the United States only 1% of people with SMI who are on supplementary security income return to work, a depressing statistic.
The editors have done an excellent job in standardizing the format of the chapters. They have written a brief introduction to each chapter, ensured that there is a conclusion, and that each chapter is well-referenced.
Despite the provisos outlined above, the book provides useful information to psychiatrists and therapists involved in the management of people with SMI. The price seems high.
DSM-5
The Intelligent Clinician's Guide to the DSM-5 The Fall of an Icon: Psychoanalysis and Academic Psychiatry 1 was outstanding, incorporating history with clinical information.
His new book is no less excellent. We have just seen the first major revision to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 20 years. In this short, easy-to-read volume, Paris has attempted to answer 3 questions: What are the changes introduced into DSM-5? What are the implications of these changes? and Are these better or worse than in previous editions? Paris, who was a strong supporter of the new approach to diagnosis introduced by DSM-III in 1980, feels there have been benefits to some of the new changes, but is highly critical of others.
The book is divided into 3 sections. The first is outstanding. Paris briefly traces the development of classification-why we need it, why our patients and their families benefit from it, and why the DSM has become such a big business for the American Psychiatric Association. This is followed by a summary of each disorder from the new DSM, a description of the changes and Paris' opinions of these. The third portion provides an overview-of how the classification will impact psychiatry and society, and how clinicians should use the manual.
While he views the DSM system of classification as beneficial, Paris recognizes the problems with the new DSM. First, the DSM looks for symptoms and puts them in categories, but the line it draws between sick and not sick is arbitrary.
Paris is particularly concerned about the ever-expanding pool of people diagnosed with mental illness, and that DSM-5 will further inflate already high prevalence rates. For example, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorderalready far more diagnosed in the United States than in the United Kingdom-will now only have to have an age of onset of 12 rather than 7; this will further increase prevalence. Paris describes a group of our colleagues as bipolar imperialists, people who are ever-expanding the spectrum of bipolar disorder so that more people can be treated with medications (but the DSM-5 committee wisely held the line at not shrinking the minimal length of a hypomanic episode from 4 days to 2). Binge eating disorder, now in the main body of the text, requires binge eating only once a week for 3 months.
By requiring only 2 weeks duration for major depressive disorder (MDD) (as in earlier versions) we have included many milder depressions that often remit. Paris wisely suggests a minimum of 4 to 6 weeks. But in DSM-5 the universal experience of bereavement is no longer excluded from MDD, again pushing more people to the diagnosis. This is a terrible idea; by making grief, pathology, we are making emotion abnormal. Grief has a useful function for us-it permits us to pay respect to the lost person while enabling us to withdraw and recover. When family doctors can only spend 10 minutes with patients, they will probably hand out medications.
DSM medicalizes normal behaviour. Social anxiety disorder was inserted as a disorder in DSM-IV in 1994.
Critics claim this is just shyness. Is it just extreme shyness? I think so, and, at times, shyness can be a quality not associated with any difficulty. It can even be admired. But it can also impair life. If you panic at the thought of going out, for example, treatment is valuable. The only way to get treatment in many countries is to have a diagnosis. Creating social anxiety disorder permits many people who suffer to get help, but it changes how we view certain characteristics. Paris sees the same happening now when grief is no longer to be excluded from diagnosis of MDD.
Does it matter that we are forever expanding our field of psychiatry and including more and more people-Paris answers, "yes, it matters." p 53 We trivialize our field, we siphon much needed resources from the seriously ill, we mix different populations for our research, and we end up giving many more people medications with potentially serious side effects.
Second, the signs and symptoms we rely on for diagnosis overlap between syndromes. I was taught that Schneider's first rank symptoms were pathognomonic for schizophrenia-it is just not so-they are found in manic depression and other disorders.
Third, reliability is better than it was pre-DSM-III (but is still just so-so for many disorders) but validity is low-these diagnoses are devised by a group of experts sitting around a table. They are almost guaranteed to get it wrong. When you are basing the diagnoses on signs and symptoms, as we have to in psychiatry today, there is no right. Our diagnoses cannot possibly be an index of the pathologies in our bodies. Also, these DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus of committee members. Committees invariably make compromises, which make the final diagnosis even more unnatural.
Fourth, the progress of science in our field of psychiatry has been modest (actually the science base has developed well, it just has shed little light on pathophysiology of the processes in the syndromes). As we have made so little gain in understanding the disease mechanisms, we cannot expect DSM-5 to be more scientific than its predecessors.
Fifth, Paris is at his best in describing the controversy over dimensions, compared with categories-DSM-5 wanted to go with dimensions for personality disorders, but then this set of changes was voted down. The general criteria for personality disorders that were introduced into DSM-IV lacked an empirical basis and have been generally considered extremely nonspecific. But after the vote was turned down, DSM-5 now lists both categories and dimensions, to stimulate further research on this topic.
There are many criticisms for sure, but the DSM is the best we have and it is hugely important because insurers, managed health care providers, and courts rely on it to decide whether treatment is funded or not. It has been valuable in many ways. It enhances reliability of diagnosis and allows clinicians to talk to each other and describe the same thing. But it has come at a huge cost. The major cost has been that psychological approaches have been downgraded, and as a result, a new generation of psychiatrists may not dig deeply into the patients' makeup. This is a problem: a diagnosis is just the beginning and can never substitute for a deep understanding of the person.
Paris understands these issues and says clinicians, "should learn it but don't believe in it."
p 187 Psychiatrists and students should buy this book-read the first and third sections and consult the second section when clinical situations arise.
The book comprises 12 chapters divided into 3 sections. The first section educates about ADHD traits. The second section focuses on strategies for overcoming difficulties in such areas as executive functioning, impulse control, self-care, and interpersonal communication. The third section gives an overview of pharmacological and nonpharmacological therapies for ADHD and concludes the book. An extensive appendix offers summaries, practical aids, and a list of resources, such as books and online aids. The book's price is appropriate for its content. The authors are a clinical researcher and a clinician, both highly reputable experts in adult ADHD.
The title of this book is an acronym to describe ADHD in adults. It stands for Forgetful, Achieving below potential, Stuck in a rut, Time challenged, Motivationally challenged, Impulsive, Novelty seeking, Distractible, and Scattered. While the acronym accurately describes many attributes of ADHD, it is long and unintuitive. Moreover, its constituents map only partially onto the current diagnostic criteria. Many adults with ADHD (or suspected ADHD) find themselves confused as to what ADHD is, or to which of its categories they belong; a diagnostic description that only partially overlaps with the criteria might only increase confusion. Moreover, if taken at face value, the title of this book implies faster than average mental processing in people with ADHD. Research does not support, and in some cases contradicts, this notion. Thus the acronym and the title, while empowering, may be covertly misleading.
The book has numerous merits. While it is written in plain language and is easy to read, it does not oversimplify the material and concepts. Importantly, it is up to date with the research in the field of ADHD. One of the book's major strengths is the dimensional view of ADHD, which also reflects the current conceptual shift in psychiatry. The book views ADHD as representing one end of the continuum on a set of normally distributed cognitive, behavioural, and emotional characteristics. Even if the degree of a person's difficulties does not reach the diagnostic threshold, he or she is offered helpful strategies without the clinical label. This approach benefits the larger group of people whose difficulties are subthreshold and for whom clinical services may not be available. Another significant strength is the upfront recognition of the heterogeneity of ADHD and the assumption that different people with Fast Minds will likely face different types of challenges. Accordingly, the book encourages self-knowledge and cultivating awareness of the effects of Fast Minds on one's particular life. Importantly, it emphasizes recognition of one's personal strengths, as well as of one's challenges. Quite helpfully, it presents case vignettes for different flavours of ADHD, which can help the reader identify their own types of challenges and solutions. The actual suggested strategies are sound, practical, and at times quite creative. They could benefit most people with Fast Minds, if used.
The book claims to stand apart from other self-help material in that it presents not just strategies, but "principles that can help [the reader] to build strategies to accommodate [his or her] own Fast Minds traits." p 99
Unfortunately, the book falls short in this regard. It does not provide a cohesive framework for understanding the principles of overcoming the challenges of ADHD. For example, to the extent that executive dysfunction is one of the central problems (as the book claims), the solution would entail reducing the impact of executive function deficits, either by targeting the deficits themselves (for example, through medication or cognitive training) or by reducing demands on executive functions (for example, by outsourcing them to devices, the environment, or other people, or by developing automated routines). The book does not follow such a cohesive framework, but uses more of a piecemeal approach, giving the reader a series of more specific tactics for staying on track and focused, keeping organized, dealing with absent-mindedness, and anticipating and preventing common pitfalls. Without a cohesive framework, these tactics are more difficult to apply, adapt, and retain.
